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Case No. 20100231-CA-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
JEFFREY MICHAEL GALLUP, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for failure to respond to an officer's 
signal to stop, a third felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-210 (West 
2004); speeding, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-
6a-601 (West 2004); and driving on a suspended or revoked operator's license, a 
class C misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-3-227(3)(a) (West 
2004). This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) 
(West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court's interpretation of the notice-of-alibi statute unfairly 
restrict Defendant's testimony, where Defendant was permitted to testify 
precisely as to his proffer? 
Standard of Review. "A matter of statutory interpretation is a question of 
law that [the appellate court] review[s] on appeal for correctness/' State v. 
Garcia, 2010 UT App 196, \ 11,236 P.3d 853. 
2. Whether Defendant invoked his right to silence by hanging up on an 
officer who merely asked for Defendant's location to talk to him? 
Standard of Review. "[The appellate court] review[s an] alleged 
constitutional violation under a correction of error standard." State v. Kiriluk, 
1999 UT App 30, | 7, 975 P.2d 469 (reviewing claim that invocation of right to 
silence under Miranda violated). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND STATUTE 
The following constitutional provision and statute are attached at 
Addendum A: 
U.S. Const, amend. V; 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-14-2 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with failure to respond to an officer's signal to 
stop, a third degree felony (Count 1), speeding, a class C misdemeanor (Count 
2), and driving on a suspended or revoked operator's license, a class C 
misdemeanor (Count 3). R2-1. A jury found Defendant guilty on all counts. 
R123,164-63. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a zero-to-five-year prison 
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term on Count 1 and 90-day jail terms on Counts 2 and 3, which Defendant was 
permitted to serve concurrently with the prison term. R167-66. Defendant 
timely appealed his convictions. R180. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 22,2008, Trooper Jared Clanton of the Utah Highway Patrol 
was on duty in his patrol car just off highway 1-15 at mile marker 285, just south 
of point of the mountain in Utah County. Id. at 20-22. His car faced north, and 
he was running radar on southbound traffic. Id. at 22. At 11:22 p.m., he saw a 
car speeding in the far right lane. Id. The trooper clocked the car traveling at 88 
miles per hour in the posted 65-miles-per-hour zone. Id. at 23. Trooper Clanton 
pursued the car, which continued to pass other cars, reaching a speed of 96 
miles per hour. Id. at 24. The trooper turned on his emergency lights as he 
approached the car. Id. at 24-25. At that point he was better able to observe the 
car's license plate and to identify the car as a dark blue BMW. Id. at 25. The 
BMW then pulled to the side of the highway. Id. 
At the stop, all of the trooper's lights — flashing "wig-wag/7 headlights, 
spotlight, and emergency lights — were activated. Id. at 26-27. Trooper Clanton 
grabbed his flashlight and approached the BMW on the passenger side. Id. at 
27. The rear windows of the BMW were tinted and the figure within was 
silhouetted by the lights of the patrol car. Id. at 25-26,40-41. As he reached the 
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rear door, the trooper looked in the direction of the driver. Id. at 28. Trooper 
Clanton saw only one person, the driver, in the car. Id. The driver was a white 
male, between 30 to 35 years of age, weighing about 190 to 200 pounds, with 
brown hair. Id. At that moment, the BMW sped away. Id. at 29. 
Trooper Clanton ran to his patrol car and pursued the BMW as it fled 
down the highway and exited off a ramp. Id. at 29. The trooper continued to 
follow the BMW into a Lehi subdivision, where it sped through a four-way stop 
sign. The trooper lost track of the fleeing car and ended his pursuit. Id. at 29-31. 
The trooper's video recorder captured the trooper's initial pursuit and the stop, 
which was admitted as Exhibit 1. Id. at 29, 31-33. 
Trooper Clanton received information from dispatch and learned that the 
BMW was registered to Defendant Jeffrey Michael Gallup. Id. at 33. The trooper 
also obtained a driver's license photograph of Defendant and Defendant's 
telephone number. Id. at 33-35. Trooper Clanton testified that Defendant's 
image in the photograph was consistent with the driver "that he saw from the 
back of the [driver] of the vehicle that day," and in court he identified Defendant 
as the driver. Id. at 34-35. Trooper Clanton confirmed that the BMW had not 
been reported stolen. Id. at 43-44. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the 
trooper had no doubt that Defendant was the driver of the BMW. Id. at 44. 
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About an hour after the incident, Trooper Clanton called Defendant's 
telephone number. Id. at 35 (Transcript of trooper's testimony of his telephone 
call to Defendant, Addendum B). A male answered the telephone, and the 
trooper asked, "Is Mr. Jeffrey Gallup there, please?" Id. at 36. The voice on the 
other end answered, "This is Jeffrey." Id. The trooper explained who he was: 
"I'm Trooper Clanton with the Highway Patrol, and I was wondering if you 
could tell me your location." Id. The trooper further said, "I'd like to meet with 
you for just a few minutes and talk to you about an incident." Id. There was a 
brief moment of silence, "possibly a second or so," and then the conversation 
ended with Defendant's hanging up. Id. The prosecutor asked the trooper, "He 
didn't say, 'Hey, I'm glad you called. I wanted to talk to you. Someone has my 
car,' anything like that?" Id. When the trooper answered, "No," the prosecutor 
again asked, "Just hung up on you?" to which the trooper said, "Yes." Id.1 
Before trial, Defendant had moved to exclude Trooper Clanton's 
testimony concerning the trooper's telephone call to him. R186:14-15. 
(Transcript of discussion and ruling on motion to exclude trooper's testimony, 
Addendum C). He principally argued that the trooper's testimony — that 
Defendant hung up the telephone on him without further conversation— 
violated his right against self-incrimination by insinuating that he was guilty. 
Id. at 14. The trial court denied the motion, stating that it was unaware of case 
law or a rule of evidence that would preclude that portion of the conversation. 
Id. at 15. The court noted that Defendant's objection to the admission of the 
circumstances surrounding the conversation was preserved for appeal. 
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On cross-examination, Trooper Clanton acknowledged that "quite a few" 
people in Utah would fit the description of the individual he saw in the BMW. 
Id. at 41-42. 
After the State rested, Defendant moved to dismiss for insufficient 
evidence on all charges. Id. at 47-48. The court denied the motion. Id. at 49-50. 
Defendant informed the court that he would testify on his own behalf. Id. at 52. 
Contemplating that the only purpose for Defendant to testify was to deny that 
he was the driver of the vehicle, the prosecutor expressed concern that the State 
had not been given sufficient notice for his testimony under Utah Code Ann. § 
77-14-2, the notice-of- alibi statute. Id. at 53 (Transcript of motion and ruling re 
alibi, Addendum D). Defendant responded that had he been successful on his 
motion to exclude the trooper's telephone call he would not have had any 
reason to testify, but because the court denied his motion it now appeared 
necessary for him to testify. Id. at 55-56. With regard to his providing alibi 
testimony, defense counsel stated that Defendant only planned to testify that he 
did not recall where he was that night: 
[My client] doesn't have a specific person who he's going to refer to 
and say, "I was with this person on such and such a night,["] which 
would be an alibi. In fact, I believe that his testimony is going to be 
that he is going to not recall exactly where he was on that night. 
. . . I can't tell you exactly what his testimony will be, but I expect 
that his testimony will be something along the lines of "I don't recall 
where I was that night. I wasn't in Utah County. I wasn't driving the 
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vehicle," but as to the specifics of "I was with so and so at this 
location at this time." That will not be his testimony. 
Id. at 57. Defendant nevertheless asserted that he believed that the notice-of-
alibi statute "always" permitted a defendant to testify, regardless of his failure 
to give the specified notice. Id. 
The trial court concluded that Defendant's proffer would not constitute 
alibi testimony and therefore any possible restriction for failure to give notice 
within the statutorily-mandated time would not be implicated. Id. at 58,62. But 
the court ruled that if Defendant intended to testify, even in the absence of 
corroborating witnesses, that he was at some specific place other than in the 
BMW when it was stopped — a place law enforcement could have investigated — 
he was nevertheless required to provide notice if he sought to establish that 
alibi. Id. at 61-63. The court reiterated that Defendant could testify as counsel 
had proffered, but that it would strike any testimony "that starts to establish a 
place where he was that night." Id. at 63. 
Defendant testified that his BMW was gray in color and that its rear 
windows were tinted 35 percent. Id. at 75 (Transcript of Defendant's testimony, 
Addendum E). Defendant stated that in October 2008 he weighed about 220 
pounds. Id. He recalled receiving a telephone call from an officer about that 
time and that they talked, but "[o]nly to the extent that I identified myself, and 
that was it." Id. at 76-77. Defendant did not recall being in Utah County on the 
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night of October 22,2008 or being pulled over by an officer. Id. at 78. He denied 
being the operator of the car Trooper Clanton stopped that night. Id. 
When asked on cross-examination who that driver was, Defendant 
responded, "I do not know/' Id. at 78-79. Defendant admitted that the car 
stopped that night was registered to him and that he spoke with the officer on 
the telephone "about an hour after that incident/' Id. at 79. When asked, "Didn't 
seem important to ask the officer more about what he was calling you about?" 
Defendant answered, "At that time, no, I did not know why he was calling me." 
Id. Defendant acknowledged that he did not further ask the officer why he was 
calling. Id. When asked why he hung up after the officer identified himself and 
stated that he "had been on the freeway[, and] I want to talk to you about some 
events that happened tonight," Defendant answered, "I was under the 
impression that he was calling on another matter." Id. at 79-80. The prosecutor 
stopped his questioning after Defendant again acknowledged that he hung up 
without further inquiring about the purpose of the officer's call. Id. at 80. At 
that point, the defense rested. Id. 
In closing, the prosecutor acknowledged that the identity of the driver of 
the car stopped by Trooper Clanton was the crucial issue. Id. at 82 (Transcript of 
closing arguments, Addendum F). Marshaling the evidence that Defendant was 
the driver, the prosecutor noted that Trooper Clanton described the driver as 
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weighing a specific amount, which differed from Defendant's weight by only 20 
pounds, and as a male Caucasian with brown hair, which was consistent with 
Defendant's driver's license photograph. Id. Referring to the trooper's efforts to 
track down the driver, the prosecutor noted the brief telephone conversation, 
observing, "If there was some sort of explanation [Defendant] could offer 
Trooper Clanton to get him away from realizing he was the real driver, that was 
the opportunity to tell Trooper Clanton, and he didn't." Id. 
In his closing argument, Defendant started with where the prosecutor 
ended. Id. at 83. He argued that he was not required to take the opportunity to 
tell the trooper what happened, but only to take the opportunity at trial to tell 
what happenened: "He had a right to remain silent." Id. He thereafter argued 
the evidence was insufficient to support convictions on the charged offenses 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 84-87. 
In rebuttal, the prosecutor reminded the jury that the trooper confirmed 
that the stopped car belonged to Defendant, that it had not been reported stolen, 
and that Defendant could not account for who the driver, other than himself, 
could have been. Id. at 88. The prosecutor asked the jury to consider 
Defendant's demeanor, as they had observed it, in evaluating Defendant's lack 
of candor and the unreasonableness — based on Trooper Clanton's description-
that anyone other than Defendant was driving. Id. at 88-89. The prosecutor 
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reminded the jury that when the trooper called him, Defendant did not ask him 
about the reason for the call, or assert that he was not the person the trooper 
stopped, or tell the officer, "I don't know what you're talking about/' Id. at 89. 
Rather, Defendant hung up the telephone. Id. The prosecutor rebuffed the 
notion that that action indicated that Defendant was exercising his right to 
silence: "Did he say, 'I decided to exercise my right to remain silent, and I hung 
up/ That's not what he said/' Id. 
At that point, defense counsel objected, stating that Defendant was not 
required to say that he was exercising his right to silence and that the 
prosecutor's comments about his exercise of his right in closing were 
inappropriate. Id. The trial court overruled the objection, but added, "I think 
enough has been said." Id. The prosecutor concluded, saying, "Hanging up that 
telephone, ladies and gentlemen, showed his consciousness of guilt." Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. Defendant argues that the trial court court prejudicially restricted 
his right to give alibi testimony concerning where he was at the time the 
offenses were committed because the express language in the statute states that 
a defendant may always testify concerning alibi. Defendant's claim fails 
because he has shown neither that his proffered testimony would constitute an 
"alibi" under the statute nor that the court's ruling curtailed his testimony. 
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The alibi statute does indeed state that a defendant may always testify on 
his own behalf concerning alibi. The plain language of the statute, however, 
expressly indicates that "alibi" refers to testimony that a person was at some 
specific place other than the scene of an offense at the time of its commission. 
Defendant proffered only that he would testify, at most, that he was not driving 
the car, not that he was actually someplace else. The trial court found that that 
testimony would not trigger the notice requirement of the statute. Thereafter, 
Defendant testified as he had proffered. In sum, Defendant never proposed to 
offer alibi evidence within the reach of the alibi statute. Consequently, his 
testimony was not curtailed by the court's or the parties' understanding of the 
statute's operation. 
Defendant nevertheless argues on both statutory and constitutional 
grounds that the trial court erred in interpreting the statute to require a 
defendant to give advance written notice that he was at some specific place 
other than the scene of the offense when it was committed. That claim is moot 
and unripe because the court's ruling could not and did not affect Defendant's 
proffered testimony. Moreover, Defendant invited any error by agreeing with 
the court that its interpretation of the statute would not affect his proffered 
testimony. The Court should thus decline to consider Defendant's claims. 
-11-
Point IL Defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly used evidence of 
his "silence" — his hanging up the telephone when the trooper called him—in 
the State's case-in-chief, on cross-examination, and in closing argument to imply 
his guilt. The argument fails because it is based on the erroneous premise that 
Defendant's hanging up the telephone necessarily constituted an invocation of 
his right to silence. The United States Supreme Court has held that an 
invocation of the right to silence, like the invocation of the right to counsel, must 
be express and unambiguous. Defendant's hanging up the telephone without 
any words of explanation does not meet that requirement. Because that action 
did not consitute an invocation of his right to silence, the prosecutor was free to 
elicit testimony about it from the trooper. The prosecutor was also then free to 
comment that Defendant's refusal to ask the trooper about the reasons for his 
call, so soon after his car was stopped, was an unnatural response from which 
Defendant's guilt could reasonably be inferred. 
Furthermore, the trooper neither interrogated Defendant nor exposed him 
to such coercion or compulsion in their brief encounter over the telepone that 
would even give rise here to the prearrest right to silence this Court found 
necessary in State v. Palmer, Utah's sole case on the issue. 
In any case, Defendant, voluntarily took the stand to explain his "silence." 
In taking the stand, Defendant exposed himself to cross-examination and 
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impeachment as to his credibility concerning his unnatural response in hanging 
up. Because impeachment was proper and elicited incredible responses from 
Defendant, the prosecutor was entitled to ask the jury to infer from those 
responses that Defendant was conscious of his guilt. 
Any error in admitting and using Defendant's hanging up was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Evidence of guilt was overwhelming. The trooper 
spoke with Defendant only about an hour after he stopped the car, which 
Defendant admitted belonged to him, which had not been reported stolen, and 
which Defendant apparently had not loaned to anyone. Further, the trooper 
had a quick view of the driver, whom he identified as Defendant " [without] 
doubt" from a photo. The trooper also unequivocally identified Defendant in 
court. Moreover, because Defendant voluntarily took the stand, the fact that he 
hung up on the trooper, as well as his refusal to respond to the trooper's 
inquiries and ail of the prosecutor's impeaching examination and comment was 
properly admitted. Thus, any error in admitting the trooper's testimony in the 




DEFENDANT FAILS TO ESTABLISH THAT HIS PROFFERED 
TESTIMONY CONSTITUTED ALIBI TESTIMONY; IN ANY 
CASE, DEFENDANT FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE TRIAL 
COURTS RULING CURTAILED HIS TESTIMONY AT TRIAL 
Defendant argues that the trial court court prejudicially restricted his 
right to give alibi testimony concerning where he was at the time the offenses 
were committed because the express language in the statute states that a 
defendant may always testify concerning alibi. Aplt. Br. at 15-20. Defendant's 
claim fails because he has shown neither that his proffered testimony would 
constitute an "alibi" under the statute nor that the court's ruling curtailed his 
testimony. 
A. The alibi statute. 
Under the notice-of-alibi statute, a defendant who intends to offer alibi 
evidence must file and serve on the prosecuting attorney a written notice of his 
intention to claim alibi, generally not less than 10 days before trial. UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 77-14-2 (1) (West 2004). The notice must specify the place where the 
defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and the names 
and addresses of the witnesses expected to establish the alibi. Id. The 
prosecuting attorney, generally not more than five days after receipt of the list of 
the defendant's expected alibi witnesses, must file and serve the defendant with 
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a comparable list of witnesses with whose testimony the State expects to 
contradict or impeach the defendant's alibi evidence. Id. The court may exclude 
evidence offered to establish or rebut an alibi if a defendant or prosecuting 
attorney fails to comply with the requirements of the statute. UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 77-14-2 (3), "However, the defendant may always testify on his own behalf 
concerning alibi/7 Id. The court may, for good cause, waive the requirements of 
this section. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-14-2 (4). 
B. Proceedings below. 
As stated, when Defendant announced that he intended to testify, the 
prosecutor expressed concern that, since the identity of the driver was the only 
real issue at trial, the substance of his testimony might concern an alibi, for 
which defendant had not provided the statutory notice necessary for the State to 
investigate the claim. R186:53. In response, defense counsel pointed to 
subsection 3 of the statute, which provides that even absent the required notice, 
a defendant was always be permitted to testify concerning alibi. Id. at 55. 
Counsel then proffered Defendant's expected testimony: 
[My client] doesn't have a specific person who he's going to refer to 
and say, "I was with this person on such and such a night,["] which 
would be an alibi. In fact, I believe that his testimony is going to be 
that he is going to not recall exactly where he was on that night. 
. . . I can't tell you exactly what his testimony will be, but I expect 
that his testimony will be something along the lines of "I don't recall 
where I was that night. I wasn't in Utah County. I wasn't driving the 
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vehicle", but as to the specifics of "I was with so and so at this 
location at this time." That will not be his testimony. 
Id. at 57. 
Based on that proffer, the court signaled its view that such testimony 
would not implicate the notice requirements of the statute and would not, 
therefore, preclude Defendant from testifying as proffered: "Okay, that will 
work." Id. The prosecutor agreed, stating that such proffer "would not go to 
the purpose and heart and spirit of the the statute," which is to enable the State 
to investigate the basis of the alibi. Id. at 57, 59. The court ruminated over 
whether testimony that Defendant was not driving when the BMW was stopped 
and was therefore necessarily somewhere else constituted an alibi. Id. at 58-61. 
But the court repeatedly stated that only if Defendant gave "any testimony that 
places him definitely somewhere else" or at a "specific place" (other than in the 
BMW when it was stopped) was an alibi requiring notice implicated. Id. 
Defendant apparently took the court's remarks to mean that he could not 
testify that he was nonspecifically "somewhere else." Id. at 61-62. That was not 
the case: 
Defense counsel: I would argue that if he has a specific 
location and a specific person who that they could check out, 
that it would be reasonable for them to check out, then the 
statute requires him to divulge that information; but if he had 
general information that says, "I don't know where I was, but 
I wasn't there," that is reasonable testimony from a defendant. 
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The Court: No, that's different from what I was saying. 
Defense counsel: Okay. 
The Court: Okay, what I was saying is, sure, if he says - -
well, I was working on the assumption that he was going to 
say he was specifically somewhere else. I guess if his 
testimony is, "I just know I wasn't on the freeway that night. I 
don't know where I was, but I wasn't on the freeway that 
night, I think that's probably allowable. 
Defense counsel: Okay. 
The Court: But if he starts to establish tht he was someplace 
else they could have investigated, that becomes an alibi, in my 
opinion. 
Defense counsel: Okay. 
Id. at 61-62. The court then opined that "if [Defendant] wants to establish his 
own alibi and doesn't have other witnesses he may do so, but he still has to give 
notice." Id. at 63. "I would strike any testimony," the court concluded, "that 
starts to establish a place where he was that night, as opposed to being on the 
freeway at the time the officer was chasing this particular vehicle that was 
registered to him. Otherwise, that approaches an alibi and notice has not been 
given, okay? So have we worked our way through that one?" Id. 
Defendant then testified that did not recall being in Utah County on the 
night of October 22, 2008 or being pulled over by an officer. Id. at 78. But he 
denie being the driver of the car Trooper Clanton stopped that night. Id. 
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C Defendant has not established that his proffered testimony 
implicated the alibi statute. 
Defendant argues that the trial court mistakenly construed the alibi 
statute to preclude a defendant from testifying when he has not given statutory 
notice. This, Defendant argues, resulted in the court's restricting his clear 
statutory right to testify concerning an alibi. Aplt. Br. at 15-19. Defendant's 
argument fails to acknowledge that the trial court's ruling here that Defendant's 
proffered testimony was not a true alibi and that he, therefore, was not required 
to give the statutory notice. Defendant also fails to acknowledge that his 
testimony was not restricted where he, in fact, testified precisely as he proffered. 
The trial court essentially issued two rulings concerning a defendant's 
alibi testimony. The first ruling was that a defendant'stestimony that he was not 
at the scene of the offense, i.e., "somewThere else,"at the time it was committed, 
without specifying where the defendant was, is not alibi testimony as 
contemplated by section 77-14-2. See R186:62. The statutory language supports 
that view: 'The notice shall contain specific information as to ike place where the 
defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense\Y UTAH CODE ANN. § 
77-14-2(1) (West 2004) (emphasis added). 
The second ruling was that a defendant's testimony that he was at some 
specific place other than the scene of the offense is alibi testimony that requires 
notice, even though the defendant offers no corroborating witnesses. R186:63. 
-18-
It is this second ruling that Defendant argues was mistaken and restricted his 
testimony. Whether that ruling was mistaken, however, is irrelevant to the 
outcome of this case, where only the first ruling pertained to Defendant and his 
proffered testimony. 
Defendant's proffer in support of his expected "alibi" testimony clearly 
shows that he sought only to testify that although he was uncertain about where 
he was that night, he was not the driver of the BMW that the trooper stopped. 
R186:57,62. Because the trial court ruled—and Defendant agreed—that this was 
not alibi testimony that required notice to the prosecution, Defendant was free 
to testify according to his proffer. Id. at 62. Defendant did precisely that. Id. at 
78. Accordingly, even if the trial court was mistaken that the statute requires a 
defendant to give notice if he intends to testify that he was at some specific place 
other than at the scene of the crime when the crime was committed, that error 
had no effect on Defendant's intended testimony and any subsequent appellate 
decision on that point could have no effect on the outcome of this case. In other 
words, the issue is moot. See Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42,44 (Utah 1989) 
("A case is deemed moot when the requested judicial relief cannot affect the 
rights of the litigants— [An appellate court] refrain[s] from adjudicating issues 
when the underlying case is moot") See also State v. Davis, 721 P.2d 894, 895 
(Utah 1986) (claimed error in trial court's sentencing orders rendered moot by 
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defendant's having served sentence); Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896,900 (Utah 
1981) (actual controversy must exist at stage of appellate review). "Because of a 
longstanding judicial policy in Utah to avoid advisory opinions, Utah appellate 
courts do not generally consider mooted questions on appeal." State v. 
Stromquist, 639 P.2d 171,172 (Utah 1981). 
Alternatively, Defendant's claim on appeal is not ripe. "Ripeness occurs 
when 'a conflict over the application of a legal provision [has] sharpened into an 
actual or imminent clash of legal rights and obligations between the parties 
thereto/" Moab Citizens Alliance v. Grand Co., 2005 UT App 323, % 9,118 R3d 879 
(quoting Boyle v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 866 P.2d 595,598 (Utah App. 1993) 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted), cert, denied, 126 P.23d 772. "Thus, 
'courtfs] will not issue advisory opinions or examine a controversy' until such a 
clash actually occurs." Id. (quoting State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 371 (Utah 
1995)). Here, no clash concerning the application of the statute occurred because 
the trial court ruled and Defendant agreed that his intended testimony was not 
within the alibi statute. Thus, the question Defendant now poses on appeal is 
hypothetical. 
Further, Defendant has made no record of additional testimony 
constituting alibi that he was precluded from making by the court's ruling. 
Thus, even if the trial court's ruling were erroneous, it was not prejudicial to 
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Defendant because he has made no showing that it actually restricted his right 
to testify as to alibi. 
In sum, Defendant's claim is moot, unrelated to the ruling he claims on 
appeal has prejudiced him, not ripe for adjudication, and unsupported by any 
showing of prejudice. This Court should therefore decline to consider it. 
2
 For substantially the same reasons, the Court should decline to consider 
Defendant's further attack on the trial court's interpretation of the alibi statute at 
Point II of his brief. Aplt. Br. at 21-24. There, Defendant claims that in 
interpreting the statute to require a defendant to give advance, written notice of 
his alibi testimony, the court both prevented him from testifying on his own 
behalf in violation of his right to due process and compelled him to incriminate 
himself. Id. As argued above, these claims are moot because the court's 
interpretation of the statute did not prevent him from testifying as he intended. 
Further, Defendant essentially invited the alleged error in the ruling he 
now challenges. Invited error trumps review even for plain error, which 
Defendant has not even argued on appeal. See State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, f 14, 
128 P.3d 1171 (stating that "under the doctrine of invited error, we have 
declined to engage in even plain error review when 'counsel, either by statement 
or act, affirmatively represented to the [trial] court that he or she had no 
objection to the [proceedings]'") (alterations in original) (quoting State v. 
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ^ 54, 70 P.3d 111). Here, Defendant finally agreed with 
the court that a defendant who wishes to testify that he was at some specific 
place other than the scene of the crime must give advance notice. R186:61-63. 
And the only instance in which Defendant briefly alluded to his right to 
testify— in a discussion dominated by the parties' focus on interpreting the 
statute — was in the context of his agreeing with the trial court's understanding 
of the statute. Id. Therefore, the Court should decline to consider Defendant's 
claim also because he invited any error. 
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POINT II 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT NEVER INVOKED HIS RIGHT TO 
SILENCE, BUT TOOK THE STAND TO EXPLAIN HIS 
ACTION, THE PROSECUTOR PROPERLY USED, 
IMPEACHED, AND COMMENTED ON DEFENDANTS 
ACTION 
Defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly used evidence of his 
prearrest "silence"— his hanging up the telephone when the trooper called 
him—in the State's case-in-chief, on cross-examination, and in closing argument 
to imply his guilt. Aplt. Br. at 27-37. The argument fails. While it is true that 
the State may not elicit evidence in its case-in-chief or therefter comment that a 
defendant has invoked his right to silence, the invocation of the right must be 
express and unambiguous. Here, Defendant's merely hanging up the telephone 
without further comment did not constitute an invocation of his right to silence 
because that action did not expressly or unambiguously signal that Defendant 
was invoking his right to silence. Further, Defendant voluntarily took the stand 
and opened the door to fair comment on his failure to explain his actions when 
he had the opportunity. Therefore, the prosecutor was free to impeach his 
credibility and ask the jury infer his guilt from his failure to explain his actions 
to the trooper. 
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A. The prohibition against using prearrest silence in the State's 
case-in-chief depends on whether the right to silence was 
invoked. 
In arguing that the prosecutor violated his Fifth Amendment right not to 
be compelled to incriminate himself, Defendant relies primarily on State v. 
Palmer, 860 P.2d 339 (Utah App. 1993). There, the prosecutor elicited and 
thereafter commented on testimony of a detective that he had a telephone 
conversation with Palmer in which Palmer suggested making a deal, but that 
"he wanted to get some advice" before talking. Id. at 345. Concluding that 
Palmer's Fifth Amendment right to silence had been violated, this Court held 
that the State may not elicit in its case-in-chief or comment on in closing 
argument a defendant's invocation of his prearrest, pre-Miranda silence. Id. at 
349-50. 
Palmer acknowledged that the United States Supreme Court had 
"expressly reserved the issue of whether prearrest silence was ever protected by 
the Fifth Amendment/' Id. at 347 n.7 (citing Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 
236 n.2, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 2128 n.2 (1980)). Nevertheless, Palmer recognized a 
prearrest right grounded in the Fifth Amendment, first, because "[t]he Fifth 
Amendment right to silence is a comprehensive privilege that 'can be claimed in 
any proceeding, be it criminal or civil, administrative or judicial, investigatory or 
adjudicatory...." Id. at 347 (emphasis in original) (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 
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1, 47-48 (1967)) (additional citation omitted). Palmer further found that 
whenever a suspect is questioned by the police, even before Miranda warnings 
must be given, if his silence may be used against him then a suspect is 
//compelled,/ to either speak or remain silent. Id. (citing State v. Fend, 325 
N.W.2d 703, 711 (1982)). The Palmer court reasoned that if the suspect's 
prearrest silence can be used against him at trial, then such procedure "places an 
impermissible burden on the exercise of Fifth Amendment rights/' (emphasis 
added). Palmer therefore held that a defendant should not penalized for 
invoking his rights even before he is subject to custodial interrogation: 
3
 For the purposes of this case only, the State does not challenge this 
Court's view in Palmer, that police questioning before arrest and before Miranda 
warnings should be given necessarily involves official compulsion. This Court 
candidly acknowledged that "[t]his analysis has been criticized by one 
commentator as incorrectly equating a requirement that a person make a 
difficult choice with government compulsion/' Palmer, 860 P.2d at 349 n.10 
(citing Barbara R. Snyder, A Due Process Analysis of the Impeachment Use of Silence 
in Criminal Trials, 29 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 285,312-18 (1988)). Indeed, the United 
States Supreme Court in Jenkins, on which Palmer relied in assessing the scope of 
the right to silence, disparaged Palme/s view: 
It can be argued that a person facing arrest will not remain 
silent if his failure to speak later can be used to impeach him. 
But the Constitution does not forbid "every government-
imposed choice in the criminal process that has the effect of 
discouraging the exercise of constitutional rights." 
Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 236,100 S. Ct. at 2128 (citations omitted). 
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[mjerely because an individual does not need to be advised of 
his right to remain silent until he is subject to a custodial 
interrogation does not mean he should be penalized/or invoking 
that right earlier. To hold differently would impermissibly 
burden Fifth Amendment protections for any individual who 
attempts to exercise them prior to a custodial interrogation. 
Id. at 349 (emphasis added). However, as Palmer indicates, the defendant who 
seeks protection in a prearrest right to silence must actually invoke that right. 
Here, Defendant did not do that. 
B. Because Defendant failed to expressly and unambiguously state 
that he did not want to speak to the trooper, he failed to invoke 
his right to silence. 
Defendant argues that "mere silence in the face of questioning by law 
enforcement officers constitutes and invocation of the privilege against self 
incrimination." Aplt. Br. at 26 (citing United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196,1200 
And since Palmer issued, other courts have rejected its view. See United States v. 
Zanabria, 74 F.3d 590,593 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting that every instance of prearrest 
silence involved government compulsion); United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 
1568 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding no constitutional infirmity with the use of prearrest 
silence in the government's case-in-chief); United States v. Oplinger, 150 F.3d 
1061,1066 (9th Cir. 1998) ("'[T]he privilege against compulsory self-incrimination 
is irrelevant to a citizen's decision to remain silent when he is under no official 
compulsion to speak.'") (quoting Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 241, 100 S.Ct.at 2130 
(Stevens, J., concurring)), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Contreras, 593 
F.3d 1135,1136, (9* Cir. 2010). Cf. United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102,1111 (8* 
Cir. 2005) (use of silence did not violate Fifth Amendment where no official 
compulsion applied to suspect after arrest but before Miranda warnings given), 
cert, denied, 546 U.S. 1151,126 S. Ct. 1165 (2006). 
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(10th Cir. 1991)). In Berghuis v.Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010), the United 
States Supreme Court rejected that theory on which Defendant rests his entire 
case-that his simply hanging up on the trooper without explanation was an 
invocation of his right to silence. The Court held that the invocation of the 
Miranda right to silence, which "protects] the [constitutional] privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination/7 could not be accomplished by mere silence, but 
must instead be done "unambiguously" by express statement. Id. at 2260. 
The facts in Thompkins starkly illustrate how emphatic a suspect's 
invocation of the right to silence must be. Thompkins was arrested in Ohio on 
suspicion of a murder committed a year and one-half earlier in Michigan. Id. at 
2256. Two officers traveled to Ohio to interrogate him. Id. At the outset, one of 
the officers read Thompkins his Miranda warnings, which included his "right to 
remain silent" and that" [a]nything you say can and will be used against you in 
a court of law." Id. Thompkins declined to sign the form, which was presented 
to him to show that he understood his rights. Id. In a room about eight by ten 
feet, the officers began to interrogate Thompkins. Id. "At no point during the 
interrogation [, which lasted almost three hours,] did Thompkins say that he 
wanted to remain silent, that he did not want to talk with the police, or that he 
wanted an attorney." Id. While Thompkins was "[l]argely" silent during the 
interrogation, he did make a few limited verbal responses, such as "yeah," "no," 
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or "I don't know/' Id. Occasionally, Thompkins communicated by nodding his 
head. Id. at 2256-57. About two hours and forty-five minutes into the 
interrogation, one of the officers posed to Thompkins a brief series of questions, 
first asking if he believed in God and last asking whether he prayed to God "to 
forgive you for shooting that boy down?" Id. at 2257. Thompkins replied to 
each question, including the last, affirmatively. Id. Thompkins would not make 
a written confession, and the interrogation ended moments later. Id. 
After being charged with first-degree murder, Thompkins moved to 
suppress his statements, arguing that he had invoked his Fifth Amendment 
right to remain silent. Id. Citing Michigan v. Moseley, 423 U.S. 96,103 (1975), 
Thompkins argued that he had invoked his right by not saying anything for a 
sufficient period of time so that the interrogation should have ceased before he 
made any inculpatory statements, as provided under Moseley, 423 U.S. at 103. 
Id. at 2259. In other words, Thompkins argued that he invoked merely by 
remaining silent in the face of questioning. 
The Court rejected Thompkins7 argument. The Court likened the 
invocation of the right to silence to the invocation of the right to counsel. Id. at 
2259-60. The right to counsel, the Court noted, must be invoked 
unambiguously; if a suspect makes an "ambiguous or equivocal" request for 
counsel or "makes no statement," the police are not required to ask questions to 
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clarify that the suspect wishes to invoke his Miranda rights. Id. Noting that both 
the right to counsel and the right to silence "both protect the privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination," the Court stated that "there is no principled 
reason to adopt different standards for determining when an accused has 
invoked [one right or the other]/' Id. at 2260. 
The Court also noted that there was "good reason to require an accused 
who wants to invoke his or her right to remain silent to do so unambiguously" [:] 
"A requirement of an unambiguous invocation of Miranda rights results in an 
objective inquiry that 'avoid[s] difficulties of proof and. . . providefs] guidance 
to officers' on how to proceed in the face of ambiguity." Id. (citing Davis v. 
United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458-459 (1994)). Otherwise, the Court observed, a 
mistaken assessment which might well follow an ambiguous invocation, 
resulting in suppression, "would place a significant burden on society's interest 
in prosecuting criminal activity." Id. 
In light of the foregoing considerations and Thompkins' failure to 
expressly and unambiguously assert that he wanted to invoke his right to 
silence, the Court held that Thompkins had failed to invoke that right: 
Thompkins did not say that he wanted to remain silent or 
that he did not want to talk with the police. Had he made either 
of these simple, unambiguous statements, he would have 
invoked his "'right to cut off questioning.'" Here he did neither, 
so he did not invoke his right to remain silent. 
-28-
Id. (citations omitted). 
In sum, a suspect invokes his right to silence only when he 
unambiguously states that he wants to remain silent or that he does not want to 
talk with the police. Mere silence in the face of questioning is not enough. 
Indeed, much of Palmer's supporting authorities on which Defendant relies, see 
Aplt. Br. at 25-26, also predicate the application of the right to silence on the 
suspect's clear invocation of the right. See Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269,286 (6th 
Cir. 2000) (stating, "[i]n the instant case, Combs clearly invoked the privilege 
against self-incrimination by telling the officer to talk to his lawyer, thus 
conveying his desire to remain silent without a lawyer present"); State v. Fend, 
325 N.W.2d 703, (Wis. 1982) (holding prosecutor's use in case-in-chief and 
comment in opening and closing argument that defendant wanted to speak to 
his lawyer violated Fifth Amendment); State v. Leach, 807 N.E.2d 335,341 (Ohio 
2004) (holding use of defendant's invocation of right to counsel constituted use 
of pre-arrest silence).4 Defendant, however, cites two cases in which mere 
silence is held to be sufficient to invoke the Fifth Amendment right. Aplt. Br. at 
4
 Defendant also cites United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869 (2nd Cir. 1981), 
asserting that it "hold[s] that a suspect's pre-arrest, pre-Miranda, silence cannot 
be use in the government's case-in-chief." Aplt. Br. at 28. In fact, the Caro court 
did not so hold, but rather assumed that even if prearrest silence was 
inadmissible in the State's case-in-chief, such use was harmless in that case. Id. 
at 876-77. 
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25-26 (citing Burson, 952 F.2d at 1200, and State v. Easter, 922 P.2d 1285,1290-91 
(Wash. 1996). In light of Thompkins, these cases are not persuasive. 
Moreover, Tliompkins' requirement that the right to silence be expressly 
and unambiguously invoked, is as applicable before a defendant is arrested or 
required to be given Miranda warnings as it is in the post-arrest, post-Miranda 
setting. As the Thompkins Court pointed out, the Miranda right to silence 
"protects] the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination/' which is the 
Fifth Amendment right. See id. 130 S. Ct. at 2260. Further, all courts that have 
considered whether prearrest silence may be used in the State's case-in-chief 
have reviewed the scope of the right to silence as it has operated in the Miranda 
context. See e.g., Palmer, 860 P.2d at 347-49 (citing federal and state cases). 
Indeed, Palmer almost states that no distinction pertains when, in holding that 
use of prearrest silence violated Palmer's constitutional right, it stated "[m]erely 
because an individual does not need to be advised of his right to remain silent 
until he is subject to a custodial interrogation does not mean he should be 
penalized for invoking that right earlier." Id. at 349 (emphasis added). 
In the circumstances of this case, Owens v. State, 937 N.E.2d 880 (Ind. Ct. 
App.), reh'g denied (2011), is illustrative. There, a detective left several successive 
messages at Owens' home requesting that he contact the detective in connection 
with child molestation allegations made against him. Id. at 883-84. Owens did 
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not respond to the messages. The prosecutor was allowed to elicit Owens' 
silence in its case-in-chief, and Owens was convicted. Id. at 883-85, 886 n.4. 
After reviewing the same authority relied on by this Court in Palmer and 
Defendant on appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals agreed that prearrest silence 
is protected by the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 885-91. The court held, however, 
that the prosecutor had not violated Owens's constitutional rights because 
Owens had not invoked his right to silence: 
Based on these cases and the particular circumstances present 
here, Owens's mere lack of response does not support a finding 
that he invoked the right to remain silent. Perhaps Owens did 
not respond because the wind blew Detective McKinney's cards 
away, or perhaps Owens was very ill or too busy, or perhaps he 
just did not like the police. Also, since Detective McKinney 
never told Owens why he wanted to talk to him, there is no basis 
to conclude that Owens even would have known that he was the 
subject of an investigation. Based on the foregoing, we conclude 
that the State did not infringe upon Owens's Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination by introducing evidence that 
Detective McKinney did not hear from Owens. 
Id. at 891-92. Cf. State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 787-88 (Utah App. 1991) 
(refusing to apply stricture against use of post-arrest silence in closing argument 
where no record evidence that the right to silence ever invoked). 
Like Owens and Thompkins, Defendant, too, failed to invoke his right to 
silence. When Trooper Clanton inquired whether Defendant could identify his 
location and whether the trooper could talk to him about an incident, Defendant 
said nothing and then hung up the telephone. R186:36. Such conduct failed to 
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satisfy the "unambiguous" invocation test required under Thompkins. It also 
failed under any reasonable common sense test to unambiguously signal that 
Defendant intended to invoke his right to silence. First, Defendant's hanging up 
the phone, in response to the trooper's question as to his whereabouts, may have 
been an expression that Defendant did not want to be found at that moment. 
Alternatively, Defendant may have been invoking his right as to the "other 
matter" that he said he believed the trooper's inquiry related to. See State v. 
Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, % 49, 162 P.3d 1106 (recognizing that the right to silence 
may be invoked as to some matters but not as to others). Indeed, Defendant's 
response to the prosecutor's final question to him essentially acknowledges that 
he was not invoking his right to silence. The prosecutor asked Defendant," [S]o 
did you ask him about that matter, or did you just hang up on him?" Defendant 
answered, "I hung upon Officer Clanton at that point." Id. at 80. In other 
words, Defendant distinguished that he chose an action in response to the 
trooper's inquiry, as opposed to an express verbal response, as required by 
Thompkins. In short, other reasonable inferences, other than the wish to invoke 
the right to silence, explain Defendant's hanging up on the trooper. Owens, 937 
N.E.2d at 891-92. Accordingly, Defendant's conduct was not protected by the 
Fifth Amendment, and the State therefore permissibly used it in its case-in-chief 
and in closing argument. 
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More fundamentally, the scenario in this case does not even trigger the 
Fifth Amendment protection this Court found necessary in Palmer, because the 
trooper's asking about Defendant's whereabouts over the telephone do not even 
amount to investigatory questioning. Palmer recognized that the Fifth 
Amendment applies even at the "investigatory" stage "in any proceeding." Id. 
at 347. However, the impetus to apply constitutional protection was largely 
driven by this Court's view that it is police questioning that creates the 
compulsion justifying the protection: "Any time an individual is questioned by 
the police, that individual is compelled to do one of two things — either speak or 
remain silent," which, absent constitutional protection, offers "no choice that 
will prevent self-incrimination." Id. at 349 (emphasis added). "Interrogation," 
at least for determining whether Miranda warnings are required, "refers not only 
to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police 
(other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police 
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the 
suspect." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). 
Here, Trooper Clanton did not interrogate or question Defendant when he 
called him. After identifying himself, the trooper simply asked if Defendant 
would identify where he was so that the trooper could meet with him to talk 
about "an incident." R186:36. The trooper did not identify the incident, and, 
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indeed, Defendant later testified that he believed the trooper's inquiry related to 
"another matter/' Id. at 80. The trooper's request to meet with Defendant was 
not questioning, words, or actions "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response." See State v. Binney, 608 S.E.2d 418, 422 (S.C.) (law enforcement 
officer's message to defendant instructing him to make written request to meet 
was not functional equivalent of interrogation, for purposes of Miranda] message 
would not reasonably elicit incriminating response but, rather, was simply 
invitation for defendant to initiate contact), cert, denied, 546 U.S. 852 (2005); 
People v. Brownell, 462 N.E.2d 936, 943-44 (111. Ct. App. 1984) (various police 
actions did not constitute interrogation where defendant was never actually 
asked a question which would have been reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response). In sum, the coercive nature of the encounter that drove 
this Court's decision in Palmer is so miniscule in this case that the right to 
prearrest silence does not even apply here. 
C. Because Defendant voluntarily took the stand to explain his 
failure to respond to the trooper, the prosecutor was entitled to 
use his "silence" to impeach his credibility. 
Defendant argues that because the trial court improperly allowed the 
prosecutor to use his "silence" in its case-in-chief, he was "compelled to waive 
his privilege against self-incrimination and take the stand to testify." Id. at 29-
30,37. Thereafter, he complains, the prosecutor improperly "badgered" him on 
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cross-examination about his hanging up and again in closing argument to imply 
that he would not have remained silent if he was innocent. Id. at 31-32. There 
was no error in allowing either the prosecutor's cross-examination or 
subsequent comments because voluntarily took the stand and thereby exposed 
himself to impeachment on his credibility. 
Defendant mistakenly asserts that the admission of his //silence,/ forced 
him to take the stand and thereby waive his right to be free from compelled self-
incrimination. On facts essentially the same as in this case, the Supreme Court 
has rejected Defendant's contention. 
In Jenkins v. Anderson, the defendant waited two weeks before reporting to 
police that he had stabbed the victim in self-defense. 447 U.S. at 233-33. At trial, 
the prosecutor attempted to impeach Jenkin's credibility by suggesting that he 
would have spoken sooner had his defense been true. Id. at 235. The Supreme 
Court concluded that once a defendant testifies, the prosecution is allowed to 
"advance[ ] the truth-finding function to the criminal trial77 by using defendant's 
silence for impeachment purposes. Id. at 238. 
In so holding, the Supreme Court recognized that "[i]t can be argued that 
a person facing arrest will not remain silent if his failure to speak later can be 
used to impeach him/7 Id. at 236. "But," the Court continued, "the Constitution 
does not forbid 'every government-imposed choice in the criminal process that 
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has the effect of discouraging the exercise of constitutional rights/" Id. (citations 
omitted). "The "'threshold question is whether compelling the election impairs 
to an appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights involved/"" Id. 
The Court readily answered that question in the negative, stating that it had 
"explicitly rejected the contention that the possibility of impeachment by prior 
silence is an impermissible burden upon the exercise of Fifth Amendment 
rights." Id. at 236-37 (citing Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926)). 
Moreover, no compulsion to testify exists even if Defendant had 
previously invoked his right to silence. See id. at 236 n.2 (declining to reach 
"whether or under what circumstances prearrest silence may be protected by 
the Fifth Amendment," "because the rule of Raffel clearly permits impeachment 
even if the prearrest silence were held to be an invocation of the Fifth 
Amendment right to remain silent").5 
5
 Contrary to Defendant's claim, the Palmer court implicitly recognized 
Jenkins' view that no constitutionally prohibited compulsion attaches to a 
defendant's decision to testify at trial in the circumstances of this case when it 
cited Jenkins' with approval in its discussion of prearrest silence. Palmer, 860 
P.2d at 347-48. Thus, when the Palmer court concluded that "admission of the 
portions of the stipulated testimony implicating [the] defendant's decision to 
remain silent, along with the prosecutor's cross examination of defendant," it 
apparently disparaged the cross-examination only because it was contingent 
upon the improper admission of the detective's stipulated testimony. Id. at 349-
50 (emphasis added). But that is not the case here. Here, because Defendant did 
not invoke his right to silence, Trooper Clanton's testimony about Defendant's 
hanging up the telephone Defendant's was properly admitted. Thus, even 
Palmer does not prohibit impeachment in this case. 
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In recognizing that a criminal defendant was under no special compulsion 
to testify, the Supreme Court in Jenkins noted that "[c]ommon law traditionally 
has allowed witnesses to be impeached by their previous failure to state a fact in 
circumstances in which that fact naturally would have been asserted/7 Jenkins, 
447 U.S. at 239 (citing 3 A J. WlGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1042, p. 1056 (Chadboum rev. 
1970)). The Court further observed that "[e]ach jurisdiction may formulate its 
own rules of evidence to determine when prior silence is so inconsistent with 
present statements that impeachment by reference to such silence is probative/7 
Id. 
In Harrison, this Court relied on Jenkins to uphold the impeachment of 
prearrest silence. Harrison was tried for murder. Harrison, 805 P.2d at 773. At 
trial, he testified and admitted shooting the victim, but that he did so in self-
defense, asserting that the victim was "pulling a gun" when Defendant shot 
him. Id. He also claimed that he told his wife and a friend that the victim had a 
gun, but that he did not call the police with this story because he or his wife 
were afraid. Id. at 774, 788, 788 n.37. Neither Harrison's wife nor the alleged 
friend testified. Id. at 774. In closing, the prosecutor attacked the self-defense 
theory, disparaging Harrison's story that the victim had a gun as "incredible" 
and essentially fraudulent: "No, that's an added detail. He made that up later. 
He never tells anybody about that/7 Id. at 787. This Court held that the 
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prosecution's "invitat[ion] to consider Harrison's significant pre-arrest conduct 
. . . was entirely permissible/' observing that his apparent failure to tell his self-
defense story to anyone was "unusually quiet behavior, in circumstances where 
he would be naturally expected to vigorously assert that [the victim] had been 
armed/' Id. at 788 (citing Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 238-40,100 S. Ct. at 2129-30).6 
The same basis for impeachment—prior inherent inconsistency with trial 
testimony-applies here. On direct examination, Defendant testified that he 
identified himself in response to Trooper Clanton's inquiry and talked "very 
briefly with him, [but] nothing further." R186:76-77. Following this testimony, 
the prosecutor stated that "[b]ased on that, Judge, the State doesn't have 
anything that would be relevant to ask the defendant." Id. at 77. Notably, 
Defendant did not mention hanging up on the trooper. Id. Thereafter, 
The basis for impeachment recognized in Jenkins and Harrison has been 
commonly applied by other courts. See e.g., State v. Cornelious, 258 S.W.3d 461, 
466 (Mo. Ct. App.), reh'g and/or transfer denied (2008) (upholding prosecutor's use 
of pre-warning silence "used to impeach the defendant when 'a neutral 
expectancy of an exculpatory statement exists as a result of a defendant's 
testimony and defendant's silence is probative of inconsistencies in that 
testimony'"); State v. Brown, 573 A.2d 886,895 (NJ. 1990) (observing that "[i]f it 
can be inferred by the fact-finder that a reasonable person situated as the 
defendant, prior to arrest, would naturally have come forward and mentioned 
his or her involvement in the criminal episode, particularly when this is assessed 
against the defendant's apparent exculpatory testimony, then the failure to have 
done so has sufficient probative worth bearing on defendant's credibility for 
purposes of impeachment"; noting that question of probativeness of prearrest 
silence, suggesting either innocent or guilty inference, is for the jury). 
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Defendant was permitted to continue his direct testimony and testified that he 
did not recall being pulled over by the trooper and that he was not driving the 
car when the trooper stopped it. Id. at 78. 
At that point, the prosecutor asked Defendant/7 [W]ho was it?" Id. When 
Defendant anwered that he did not know, the prosecutor elicited Defendant's 
acknowledgment that the car in question was registered to him. The prosecutor 
then asked Defendant if it seemed important to "talk to the [trooper] a little bit 
more about the incident and figure out what [the officer] was talking about?" 
Id. at 79. In response to that question and essentially a repetition of the same 
question, Defendant answered, "At that time, no, I did not know why he was 
calling me." Id. When the prosecutor then asked Defendant why he hung up on 
the trooper, Defendant twice responded that he thought the trooper was calling 
on "another matter." Id. at 79-80. Finally, when the prosecutor asked 
Defendant, "so did you ask him about that matter, or did you just hang up on 
him?" Defendant answered, "I hung upon Officer Clanton at that point." Id. at 
80. 
The prosecutor's impeachment in this case was permissible as it was 
clearly directed toward exposing the incredibility of Defendant's story. 
Defendant acknowledged on direct examination that it was his car the trooper 
stopped. But he also testified that he was not the driver and that there was 
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nothing unusual in his hanging up on the trooper who apparently called him 
about the incident. In so testifying, Defendant opened the door to an 
examination of his unnatural behavior in the circumstances. Specifically, the 
trooper called Defendant about an hour after he had stopped his car, which was 
at 11:22 pm. R186:22, 35. Upon Defendant's answering the telephone, the 
trooper identified himself as a Utah Highway patrolman and asked for 
Defendant's wherabouts so that he could talk to him about "an incident." Id. at 
36. No resort to authority is necessary to recognize that immediately hanging 
up on a law enforcement officer calling in the middle of the night about a 
specific incident was an unnatural response when further inquiry would 
normally be expected. 
Having successfully challenged Defendant's credibility, the prosecutor 
was entitled to comment on it. In closing argument, the prosecutor again noted 
that Defendant made no effort to explain to the trooper that he was not the 
driver of the car the trooper stopped. Id. at 82. Defendant responded, stating 
that he was not required to respond to the trooper and that he had a right to 
remain silent. Id. at 83. Accordingly, on rebuttal, the prosecutor repeated his 
earlier comment, but further noted that in hanging up Defendant never 
indicated that he was exercising his right to remain silent. Id. at 89. When 
Defendant objected, asserting that he was not required to expressly assert his 
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right. Id. The trial court overruled the objection, but stated, "I think enough has 
been said." Id. At that point, the prosecutor ended his remarks, stating, 
"Hanging up that phone, ladies and gentleman, showed his consciousness of 
guilt" Id. 
The prosecutor's comments in closing argument were also proper. He 
simply expressed the reasonable inference to be drawn from Defendant's 
unnatural response to the trooper's investigation: if Defendant was not the 
driver of the car he, as an innocent person, could have simply said so, and 
because he did not so speak, the jury was entitled to infer that his silence 
signaled a consciousness of guilt. See e.g., Harrison, 805 P.2d at 788. See also 
State v. Bullock, 546 P.2d 1158,1160-61 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) (holding fact that 
accused, exhibiting suspicious behavior in high-narcotics-traffic area, took flight 
when officer subsequently asked if he could talk to accused was a fact from 
which jury could draw an inference of guilty knowledge in prosecution for 
unlawful possession of heroin and marijuana; rejecting that such conduct was 
equivalent of accused's Fifth Amendment right not to testify). Cf. State v. 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, | 23,10 P.3d 346 (recognizing that "[wjhile a defendant's 
flight from a crime scene, standing alone, 'does not support an inference of 
intentional conduct,' the circumstances of a defendant's flight, in addition to 
other circumstantial evidence, may be adequate to support such an inference.") 
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(citation omitted); State v. Simpson, 120 Utah 596,600,236 R2d 1077,1079 (1951) 
(recognizing that "[f]light and concealment immediately following the 
commission of a crime are both elements which may be considered as evidence 
of implication in that crime"). Further, the prosecutor's express reference to 
Defendant's failure to invoke his right to silence was proper not only because 
Defendant did not invoke his right to silence, but also because Defendant 
himself opened the door to the prosecutor's reference to silence. Cf United 
States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 31-32,108 S. Ct. 864, 868-69 (1988) (holding that 
prosecutor's reference in rebuttal to respondent's opportunity to testify was "fair 
response" to a claim made by respondent's counsel who opened the door to 
door to comment and did not thereby violate respondent's right to remain silent 
at trial). In sum, the prosecutor's comments were properly presented to the 
jury. 
D. Any error in admitting the hooper's testimony and the 
prosecutor's use of Defendant's "silence," was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
Even if it were error to admit evidence that Defendant hung up on the 
trooper and to allow the prosecutor to comment on that action and its 
significance, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. 
Dahlquist, 931 P.2d 862,867 (Utah App. 1997) (applying constitutional harmless-
beyond-reasonable-doubt standard in case of statements improperly admitted 
after invocation of Miranda right to silence). Accord, Chapman v. California, 386 
U.S. 18, 21, 87 S. Ct. 824, 826-27 (1967). In determining whether an eror is 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the court "must decide whether other 
credible evidence . . . is so compelling that we can conclude, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the jury would have reached the same verdict without 
learning of [the defendant's] incriminating statement/7 Id. 
The jury here would have reached the same verdict if it had never heard 
the evidence of Defendant's hanging up or the prosecutor's comments on it. 
Direct evidence supported almost all the elements of the offenses Defendant was 
charged with. It was undisputed that Trooper Clanton observed Defendant's 
car speeding and its flight after the stop (R186:24, 29-33). The only element in 
dispute at trial was Defendant's identity as the driver. But both circumstantial 
and direct evidence supported that element. Defendant admitted that the car 
was registered to him (R186:79); that the car had not been reported stolen 
(R186:43-44); and that the trooper spoke to Defendant only an hour after the 
incident (R186:35). Trooper Clanton had a brief opportunity to view the driver 
of the car. From that view the trooper fairly accurately identified Defendant's 
height and weight and identified Defendant himself, from the picture attached 
to his driver's license and in court. R186:29, 33-35, 75. The trooper had "no 
doubt" that Defendant was the driver of the car. R186:44. Other than 
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Defendant's self-serving assertion that he was not the driver, there was no 
contesting evidence in this case. That evidence led inexorably to the conclusion 
that Defendant was guilty of failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, 
speeding, and driving on a suspended or revoked operator's license. 
Further, even if it were error to admit the the trooper's testimony in the 
State's case-in-chief, the substance of that testimony, as well as Defendant's 
refusal to respond to the trooper's inquiries and all of the prosecutor's 
impeaching examination and comment were admissible. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 
236-37. As set out above, that impeachment properly developed the facts and 
the inferences supporting Defendant's guilty mind in connection with the 
charges. In short, the jury was properly allowed to hear all of the evidence that 
Defendant now claims was improperly admitted. And contrary to Defendant's 
assertion, see Aplt. Br. at 37, he was not improperly compelled to take the stand 
to testify after the trooper testified that he hung up the telephone. See Jenkins, 
447 U.S. at 236, 100 S. Ct. at 2128. Indeed, Defendant's suggestion that he 
would not have testified if the trooper's testimony had not been admitted is 
suspect, for without Defendant's testimony there was no defense opposing the 
trooper's identfying him as the driver. That defense was nevertheless utterly 
insufficient in the face of the State's compelling evidence of guilt. In sum, any 
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error in admitting evidence of Defendant's "silence" was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's 
convictions. 
Respectfully submitted 7th day of April. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
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Addendum A 
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. V-Full Text 
United States Code Annotated Currentness 
Constitution of the United States 
l lAnnotated 
"llAmendment V. Grand Jury Indictment for Capital Crimes; Double Jeopardy; Self-incrimination; 
Due Process of Law; Just Compensation for Property (Refs & Annos) 
••Amendment V. Grand Jury Indictment for Capital Crimes; Double Jeopardy; Self-
incrimination; Due Process of Law; Just Compensation for Property 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or 
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-14-2 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
*HChapter 14. Defenses 
•*§ 77-14-2. Alibi—Notice requirements—Witness lists 
(1) A defendant, whether or not written demand has been made, who intends to offer evidence 
of an alibi shall, not less than 10 days before trial or at such other time as the court may allow, 
file and serve on the prosecuting attorney a notice, in writing, of his intention to claim alibi. The 
notice shall contain specific information as to the place where the defendant claims to have been 
at the time of the alleged offense and, as particularly as is known to the defendant or his 
attorney, the names and addresses of the witnesses by whom he proposes to establish alibi. The 
prosecuting attorney, not more than five days after recent of the l»st prov»ded herein or at such 
other time as the court may direct, shall file and serve the defendant with the addresses, as 
particularly as are known to him, of the witnesses the state proposes to offer to contradict or 
impeach the defendant's alibi evidence. 
(2) The defendant and prosecuting attorney snail be under a continuing duty ro disclose the 
names and addresses of additional witnesses which come to the attention of either party after 
filing their alibi witness lists. 
(3) If a defendant or prosecuting attorney fails to comply with the requirements of this section, 
the court may exclude evidence offered to establish or rebut alibi However, the defendant may 
always testify on his own behalf concerning alibi. 
(4) The court may, for good cause shown, waive the requirements of this section. 



























find that these di° busnebS records. 
MR. JOHNSON: Okay. 
THE COURT: Go anead. 
g. BY MF. JOHNSON: Did you -- after looking at the 
picture of Mr. GalJup that evening, did that seem consistent 
with the brief description that you saw from the back of the 
driver of the vehicle that day' 
A. res, it dj d. 
0. Were you -- did you conduct an investigation further 
into contacting Mr. Gallup that evening? 
A. I did. 














-- so we can steer the "jury the right way. Did you 
a phone number that belonged to the defendant that 
Yes, I aid. 
What did you do with that number? 
I called that number from my office. 
Okay, how long after this incident? 
It was probably -- approximately an hour. 
Okay. 
About that, T woulj think. 



























call to FYie jury, what happened when you called tnat number? 
A. \e^. A male an^w^ied the phone, and I simply asked 
-- in rart, I saxd, NTb Mr. lottery Gallup there, please." 
The Pdle \.oi^ e on rti*=- other end of the phon^ said, "This is 
Jeffery." 
Q. Okay. 
A. At that p^jnt I explained who I was. "I'm Trooper 
Cjdnton with tre Highway Patrol, i i 1 was wondering if you 
could tell me your location. I'd like to meet with you for 
just a few minutes and talk to you about an incident," and 
rhei,- was -- *r i then at ^jt poirt there was a brief moment 
of silence, possibly a second or so, and then the conversation 
ended. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Tne person on the other end of the phone hung up the 
phone. 
Q So ^e ^ung un on you? 
A. Correct. 
Q He dih't sa^, vHev, I'm qlad you called. I wanted to 
talk to you. Someone has my ~ar," anything like that? 
A. Mo. 
(^. Just 1 ung up on you? 
A. Yes. 
MR. JOHNSON- Okay, that's all I have for this witness. 
Thank VOJ. 
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THE COURT: All right. Cross exam? 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SESSIONS: 
Q. So the call that took place, it was about an hour 
later when you were back in Utah County? 
A. Approximately tnat, yes. 
Q. Okay --
A. It's a guess, but --
Q. -- so it's on the same -- I was going to say the same 
night, but if this started at 11 o'clock, it would probably be 
early hours of the next morning? 
A. It could have been, yeah. I just went to the office 
from where I was. I was m Lehi. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I actually sat at that intersection for a couple of 
minutes, too, so --
Q. Yeah, I watched that. It was kind of boring. The 
-- =md when you asked him -- on this phone call you just said, 
>XI want to talk to you about an incident." That's what you 
testified to? 
A. About an incident that occurred that evening. 
Q. Ana ne chose noc 10 tdlk to you? 
A. Apparently. 
Q. Okay, and if you weie to just call anybody at night 



























to converse with you or speak, are they? 
MR JOHNSON: Objection, relevance. 
THE COURT: Ovprrulpd. 
Q. BY MP. SESSIONS: IOU can answer the question. 
A. They're fr^e to sav whatever they want, or not to 
speak. 
0- Okay, thank you. You uidn't record this phone call, 
or did you record the call? 
A. No, I did not. I turned it on. I hit my mic, but it 
was too late. In fact, I think you hear me say I should have 
hit it sooner and I'didn't. So I did not. 
Q. Technology is good when it works, and when it doesn't, 
it fails, huh9 
A. If we use it appropriately, yes. 
0- In fact, I wanted to ask you, you said something about 
a 20 second delay on the tape that we're watching on this 
video. 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Now, can you explain that to me a little bit? 
A. I can. Our technology, the computer guys, the ones 
that ar^ jri rhaige of digital equipment on ^he vehicles, they 
act.dlly set -- the video's always recording, because of it 
bemq digital. Then anytime I hit record, whether ~ do it 
manually or if I ^urn my lights on also, the video automatic-
ally jumps ahead 30 secords to from the time that I hit the 
Addendum C 
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1 you're going to need to object again to preserve your objection 
2 I consider your objection preserved. 
3 MR. SESSIONS: Okay, and then I also wanted to preserve 
4 an objection as to the officer testifying that my client just 
5 hung up on them without further conversation. My argument on 
6 that -- I brought up a little bit in chambers, but I wanted to 
7 make sure I do it on the record — is that my client has a 
8 right against self-incrimination. 
9 Obviously when he hangs up, he's not making any 
10 statements and he's exercising that right against self-
11 incrimination. Realizing he's not in custody at that point 
12 because he's over the phone, but whether he's in custody or 
13 not he has a right to not incriminate himself and not make 
14 statements. 
15 So by the officer testifying that he made a call and 
16 the defendant hung up on him, I believe that that insinuates 
17 that my client was guilty in some way. So it's my argument 
18 that it's inappropriate for that to be commented upon. 
19 THE COURT: Mr. Johnson. 
20 MR. JOHNSON: I think, Judge, that under the Rules of 
21 Evidence, I still think it comes in as either an admission or 
22 that it's not hearsay at all by his action of hanging up. I 
23 think, you know, verbally saying something, "This is Jeffery," 
24 that's clearly a verbal statement. That would be an admission. 
25 Silence can be interpreted as an admission. Again, I 
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1 I think it's from tne defendant. It's contemporaneous with the 
2 conversation. It's not like the person said, vvHere, talk to 
3 so and so," and then that person is silent. I think it's all 
4 contemporaneous. I think it comes in under the hearsay rule. 
5 Again, he wasn't in custody so there wasn't any sort of Miranda 
6 issue. I know he concedes that, but I think it's admissible, 
7 the totality of that conversation, however brief it was. 
8 THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Sessions? 
9 MR. SESSIONS: No, I'll submit it. 
10 THE COURT: I don't know anything under the case law or 
11 the Rules of Evidence that would preclude that portion of the 
12 conversation, or that action from coming in. So I wall allow 
13 that portion of the testimony to come m , and I'll note your 
14 objection. 
15 MR. SESSIONS: Okay, and I won't make the objection at 
16 the time the testimony comes in. 
17 THE COURT: Okay, yeah, your objections are preserved 
18 for purposes of appeal. 
19 MR. JOHNSON: That's all that the State has. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? 
21 MR. SESSIONS: No, 
22 THE COURT: Okay, let's take our recess, and then it is 
23 Judqe Davis's courtroom we're going to be in. 
24 MR. JOHNSON: Okay, 301? 
25 THE COURT: Yeah, 301. Okay, so let's get up there as 
Addendum D 
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1 whatever, I'm -- the State is concerned, certainly, if he's 
2 testifying that the State has not received any notice of alibi, 
3 if that's --- I think -- 1 don't know any other way to not go 
4 into that. 
5 THE COURT: Let's get a microphone there. Yeah. So 
6 your concern is that his testimony may --
7 MR. JOHNSON: I think, unless he asks him what time 
8 of day it is today or something, that if he talks about the 
9 incident, it's going to necessarily implicate whether or not he 
10 was present in the vehicle; and if not, then he's talking about 
11 an alibi defense. That's news to the State as of January 5th at 
12 12:20. So I think under the rule 77-14-2, that we need to have 
13 that notice at least ten days before trial, so we can research 
14 and investigate what he may be claiming. 
15 THE COURT: It's a valid concern, Mr. Sessions. Is 
16 your client going to -- with regard to the incident, not the 
17 phone call, I assume, but with regard to the incident, is he 
18 going to testify with regard to anything that would be an 
19 alibi, indicating he wasn't in the car that night? Because 
20 if it goes that direction, I think the State's correct; it's 
21 an a] lbi . 
22 MR. SESSIONS: I think --
23 THE COURT: I auess the second question is, is he also 
24 intending to testify about the telephone call. Hypothetically, 
25 if that was all he wanted to testify about, I think I would 
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1 probably end up ruling that that opened the door for testimony 
2 about everything, or questions from the State about everything. 
3 MR. SESSIONS: That's a -- goes along the lines of the 
4 conversation that I was having with him, because in regards to 
5 him, my client wanting to testify, it is to the issue of to the 
6 telephone, because he wants to explain why he would elect not 
7 to talk to the officer on the telephone. 
8 I had a talk with him about limiting that in the 
9 scope, in which I would on direct. Then the question on cross 
10 exam:nation of whether or not the Court was going to allow it 
11 or not, that may go to the point where the State is asking 
12 questions that would illicit an alibi of defense, meaning an 
13 alibi as to "Someone else was in the car," or "I wasn't in the 
14 car." 
15 THE COURT: Right. I think whether the State illicits 
16 the alibi defense or you do, I think the notice issue is still 
17 there. I think if he's going to testify in any way, shape or 
18 form with regard to an alibi, then -- I'm sorry, he doesn't 
19 have all of his code books out here -- but I think if he's 
20 going to testify as to an alibi, the notice is there. You've 
21 got the statute up, Mr. --
22 MR. JOHNSON: I do, Judge, under 77-14-2, the defendant 
23 -- under subsection (1) "The defendant, whether or not written 
24 demand has been made, who intends to offer evidence of an 
25 alibi, shall not less then ten days before trial or at such 
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time as the Court may allow, file and serve on the prosecuting 
attorney a notice in writing of his intention to claim alibi. 
The notice shall contain specific information as to the place 
where the defendant claims to have been at the alleged offense 
-- time of the alleged offense, and as particularly as it's 
known to the defendant or his attorney the names and addresses 
of the witnesses by whom he purposed to establish that alibi." 
Then it goes into what our duty is of the State to rebut that. 
Under subsection (3) "If a defendant or prosecuting 
attorney fails to comply with the requirements of the section, 
the Court may exclude evidence offered to establish or rebut 
alibi. However the defendant may always testify on his own 
behalf concerning alibi.'7 
Then under subsection (4), it says, "Th~e Court may, 
for good cause shown, waive the requirements of the section." 
The State would argue there is no good cause. This has been 
going on for a while. 
THE COURT: Do you want me to get a copy of the code so 
you can look at the whole thing? 
MR. SESSIONS: We need to look at that, because it 
sounds to me like the defendant can always testify, according 
to that code section. Let me just be a little more clear, 
too, because I had not intended that my client would need to 
testify. If I had b^en successful on the objection to the 
foundation and the phone call evidence coming m , he would 
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1 have had no reason to testify, and he would not have been 
2 testifying. 
3 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
4 MR. SESSIONS: But because I was overruled on that, 
5 and that evidence came m, it appears necessary that he does 
6 testify. I would like to limit it to the specific testimony 
7' related to the telephone call; but the Court has opined that 
8 its likely that that would open the door for all questions. I 
9 think we need to look at the code section. 
10 MR. JOHNSON: It's 77-14 — 
11 THE COURT: Okay, could I have the red book back? Oh, 
12 77 is here. Oh, gosh, it's 1997. Judge Davis, why have you 
13 got that? 
14 MR. SESSIONS: Its 77-14-2? Great, then I'll put it in 
15 my book. 
16 THE COURT: Has it been amended anytime recertly? 
17 MR. JOHNSON: In 1980. 
18 THE COURT: That's not recent.. Okay, we're good. 
19 MR. JOHNSON: So 9^7 would be accurate. 
2 0 THE COURT: Yeah. 
21 MR. JOHNSON: Surprisingly enough. 
22 THE COURT: Yeah, it's not in here. Let me go back to 
23 thi? one here. No, they skip past it in both of these. Would 
24 you go borrow Judge Davis' Volume 4. 
25 MR. SESSIONS: While she's getting that, your Honor, I 
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1 would supplement my argument that my client doesn't have a 
2 specific person who he's going to refer to and say, "I was 
3 with this person on such and such a night,: which would be an 
4 alibi. In fact, I believe that his testimony is going to be 
5 that he is going to not recall exactly^where he was on that 
6 night. 
7 These charges were brought in March from an event in 
8 October, and I can't tell you exactly what his testimony will 
9 be, but I expect that his testimony will be something along 
10 the lines of "I don't recall where I was that night. I wasn't 
11 in Utah County. I wasn't driving the vehicle;" but as to 
12 specifics of "I was with so and so at this location at this 
13 time," that will not be his testimony. 
14 I "think given how procedurally this has ended up 
15 before the Court at trial, the exception does apply, but the 
16 defendant may always testify as to an alibi. 
17 COURT CLERK: (Inaudible). 
18 THE COURT: Okay, that will work. 
19 MR. JOHNSON: I guess, Judge, if he's — his proffer 
20 is, as it seems quite vague, I guess the State doesn't — even 
21 if we had that information, that would not go to the purpose 
22 and heart and spirit of the statute. So the State would not 
23 object. 
24 Certainly if he gets up there and says, "I was at the 
25 Gallivan Center on that day," then that's where I think the 
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1 fundamental and fairness and surprise comes to the State. So 
2 I'll leave that up to the Court to rule. 
3 THE COURT: I note that 77-14-2 says that "The notice 
4 shall contain specific information as to the place where the 
5 defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged 
6 offense, and as particularly as is known to the defendant or 
7 his attorney the names and addresses of the witnesses by whom 
8 he purposes to establish an alibi." 
9 So if his testimony is, >XI don't remember where I was 
10 that night," I think that doesn't constitute an alibi; but I 
11 think for him to say, "I wasn't m my car that night, and I 
12 wasn't m Utah County that naght," is by inference to say, "I 
13 was somewhere else " 
14 So I think for him to be specific enough to say, "I 
15 wasn't there," so ergo, "I was somewhere else," I think that 
16 starts to go towards an alibi; but I think If he just wants to 
17 say, NVI don't remember where I was that night," I think that's 
18 probably safe. 
19 MR. JOHNSON: That's fine with the State. 
20 MR. SESSIONS- Your Honor, I think — 
21 THE COURT: And aoesn't need notice. 
22 MR. SESSIONS. -- if he were saying, "I wasn't there, 
23 but I was at this location, and so and so witnessed re at that 
24 location," that's clearly an alibi. 
2 5 THE COURT: Right. 
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1 MR. SESSIONS: But if he ]ust says, "I wasn't there. I 
2 think I was at this location, but nobody was there/' that's an 
3 explanation but not an alibi, as I would understand alibi in 
4 the statute. 
5 THE COURT: Well, but if he says, "I was at another 
6 location," and that notice had been given, they could go to 
7 that location and investigate. 
8 MR. SESSIONS: But if he says, "I was at my home that 
9 night," how would they be able to go to that location — 
10 MR. JOHNSON: Well, because — 
11 MR. SESSIONS: — and know he was there or not there on 
12 that night? 
13 MR. JOHNSON: Well, because the officers actually did, 
14 and he wasn't there. So — but we did do that. So he can say 
15 that if he wants. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. 
17 MR. SESSIONS: And we'll go to there. 
18 THE COURT: So as far as any testimony that places him 
19 definitely somewhere else, I think that constitutes at least a 
20 partial alibi; and notice should have been given to the State 
21 so that they could either check out that story or not, as the 
22 case may be. 
23 Now apparently there's testimony that the officer 
24 could give that hasn't been given, that they went to the home 
25 that night? 
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1 MR. JOHNSON: What it is, is it would be hearsay, 
2 because it was other officers who went. Again, part of this 
3 investigation was trying to find the number. Contacted other 
4 troopers who went to his Murray address that he had on his 
5 driver's license, and said, "Go to there, see if the car's 
6 there, see if the defendant's tnere." That was within — 
7 OFFICER CLANTON: It was about the same time. We were 
8 at the office and called. 
9 MR. JOHNSON: So within an hour. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. 
11 MR. JOHNSON: They knocked on the door, they looked in 
12 the garage. 
13 MR. SESSIONS. Two of them went, a Sergeant and another 
14 trooper. 
15 MR. JOHNSON: So we would want to bring them m , but — 
16 THE COURT: You haven't been given notice. 
17 MR. JOHNSON: Yeah, that's the — 
18 MR. SESSION: But if we got to that point, your Honor, 
19 that was the address the DMV had. That was not my client's 
20 current address. he had mo^ed from that residence. So of 
21 course he wouldn't have been at that residence. I mean, we 
22 are kind of getting aown to a tangential line there. 
23 MR JOHNSON: At some point when you say, "You know 
24 what, I have no idea where I was. It was a year and a half 
25 ago," but then you could say at the same time, "but I know 
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1 for sure I wasn't there. I wasn't in Utah County. I wasn't 
2 driving," it seems to speak out both sides of his mouth, and 
3 that's where — 
4 THE COURT: I don't think you can have it both ways, 
5 Mr. Sessions. 
6 MR. SESSIONS: Pardon me? 
7 THE COURT: I think you can have it both ways. I think 
8 he either testifies he doesn't have a memory or he doesn't know 
9 where he was that night, or he doesn't testify as to where he 
10 was that night, because if he is going to say, "I was at a 
11 specific place that night," then the State should have had 
12 notice and should have had an opportunity to do whatever 
13 investigation they wanted to do in order to try and either 
14 corroborate his story, or to debunk his story; but I don't — 
15 I don't think he can have it both ways. So that's his choice. 
16 MR. SESSIONS: Weil, your Honor, I would argue that 
17 I the defendant always does have the right to explain himself, 
18 because he is the defendant in a criminal case and has that 
19 J right. That's an exception in the statute. 
20 I would also argue that simply not knowing where you 
21 are specifically doesn't mean that you can't exclude other 
22 places. He could say, "Well, I know I wasn't in Switzerland 
23 that night, because I've never been to Switzerland." He could 
24 say, "I know I wasn't in Utah County, because I had no reason 
25 to go to Utah County." "I know I wasn't in Canada, but I don't 
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1 know exactly where I was. I was somewhere else." 
2 1 believe that he should be allowed to testify to 
3 that, because he should be allowed to answer the questions 
4 against him. I understand the alibi statute is in place so 
5 that the officers can do an appropriate investigation, but also 
6 the defendant doesn't have a burden of proof, and the defendant 
7 has the right to remain silent. The defendant doesn't have to 
8 help the officers in all of their investigation. 
9 I would argue that if he has a specific location and a 
10 specific person who that they could check out, that it would be 
11 reasonable for them to check out, then the statute requires him 
12 to divulge that information; but if he had general information 
13 that says, *VI don't know where I was, but I wasn't there," that 
14 is a reasonable testimony from a defendant. 
15 THE COURT: No, that's different from what I was saying. 
16 MR. SESSIONS: Okay. 
17 THE COURT: Okay, what I was saying is, sure, if he 
18 says -- well, I was working on the assumption that he was going 
19 to say he was specifically somewhere else. I guess if his 
c 
20 testimony is, 'VI just know I wasn't on the freeway that night. 
21 I don't know where I was, but I wasn't on the freeway that 
22 night," I think that's probably allowable. 
23 MR. SESSIONS: Okay. 
24 THE COURT: But if he starts to establish that he was 
2 5 someplace where they could have investigated, that becomes an 
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1 alibi, m my opinion. 
2 MR. SESSIONS: Okay. 
3 THE COURT: I don't read the — be quiet, Mr. Gallup. 
4 I don't read the sentence "However, the defendant may always 
5 testify on his own behalf concerning alibi" as something that 
6 negates the previous two paragraphs. I think that just simply 
7 means if he wants to establish his own alibi and doesn't have 
8 other witnesses he may do so, but he still has to give notice. 
9 So in his testimony today, if he wants to get up and 
10 say either "I don't have a memory of where I was," or >VI know 
11 I wasn't on the freeway that night; don't know where I was, 
12 but I wasn't on the freeway," I mean, if he just wants to do a 
13 blanket denial that he was speeding, I don't think the statute 
14 precludes him from doing that. 
15 I would strike any testimony that starts to establish 
16 a place where he was that night, as opposed to being on the 
17 I freeway at the time the officer was chasing this particular 
18 vehicle that was registered to him. Otherwise, that approaches 
19 an alibi and notice has not been given, okay? So have we 
20 worked our way through that one? 
21 (Counsel conferring off the record) 
22 THE COURT: I'm ready to move on, folks. We've got a 
23 jury coming back m less then 50 minutes. Okay, as to the jury 
24 instructions, I am a little concerned, since identity is not — 
25 identity is very important in this case, we don't have a long 
Addendum E 
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1 A. Yeah, it's a 2002 BMW 325i. 
2 0- And what color is that car? 
3 A. The car is grey. 
4 Q. Okay, tell me about the windows on the car. 
b A. The rear windows on the car are tinted. What I mean 
6 by that is the rear windows have what's called over 35 percent 
7 light diffusion, so they actually would oe illegal to have on 
8 the front windshield ~- the front windows or windshield; but 
9 the -- Utah allows you to have that high of a level of tint if 
10 it's on the rear windows. 
11 Q. Is that a standard tint on those, or is it an after-
12 market? 
13 A. That's an aftermarket tint that I put on the car. 
14 Q. Okay, and there's been a lot of testimony back m 
15 October of 2008. Do you recall back to then9 
16 A. I do. 
1*7 Q. Okay. Tell me, do you recall about how much you 
18 weighed at that time? 
19 A. On or about October of 2008 I would have weighed 
20 about 220 pounds. 
21 Q. Okay, this BMW, were you the only driver — well, 
*-<- I no, x6t me ask yza some Guiier quesiions. Tneie's been some 
23 testimony about a phone call that the officer says he made 
24 to d Jeiiery Gallup. Do you recall receiving a phone call 
25 sometime in the fall of 2008? 
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1 MR. JOHNSON: Sorry, I should say the defense calls the 
2 attendant, Jeff^ry Gallup, to the stand. 
3 COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear the testimony you 
4 shall give in the case now pending before the Court will be 
5 the truth, the whole trutt and nothing but the truth, so help 
6 you God*"* 
7 THE WITNESS: I do. 
8 THE COURT: All right, come have a seat. Let's see, 
9 Mr. Gallup, if you'll get that mic aimed right at your mouth. 
10 Yeah, you can adjust that chair wherever you need it. That 
11 looks gieat. Thank you. 
12 JEFFEPY GALLUP, 
13 having been first duly sworn, 
14 testified as follows: 
15 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
16 BY MR. SESSIONS: 
17 Q. Sir, will you please state your name for the record. 
18 J A. Teffery Michael Gallup. 
19 Q. You've been present today during these proceedings; is 
20 that correct7 
21 A. That's correct. 
22 I Q. OKay, I ]ust want to asK you a few prooao^y prerty 
23 specific questions, so we don't gpt to far afield on where we 
24 are; but there's been quite a b±t of testimony about a vehicle 




























I do Subsequentiv, after being informed these charges 




I cal.x . 
A. 
Q. 
if I had loaned my car out around the date in question, 
October of 2008. 
MR TOHNSON: Objection, non-responsive. 
BY MR. SESSIONS: Okay, I'm asking you about the phone 
Do you remember a phone call during that time period? 
I think I remember the -- a phone call, yes. 
Okay, and tell me what was going on in your life at 
that time regarding phone calls from officers. 
MR. JOHNSON: Objection, relevance. 
THE COURT: Counsel, why don't you approach. 
(Discussion at the bench off the record) 
MR. SESSIONS: I'm just making sure I've asked the 
questions that I wanted to get answers to, and I don't have any 




THE WITNESS: In regards to the -
MR. SESSIONS: Nc, there's no question. 
THE COURT- There's not a question posed. 
MR. SESSIONS: If I may approach the witness? 
THE COURT: Yes, I'll turn off the mics. 
(Counsel confers witn defendant off tne record. 
EY MR. SESSIONS: Let me reask the question. Do you 
receiving a phone call in October from an officer? 



























Q. Okay, anl did you talk with him at that point? 
A. Very briefly. Only to the extent that I identified 
myself, and that was it. 
o. Okay. 
A. Nothing furtnei. 
Q. Do you recall the number he called from? 
A. I au not. I know ne called from a blocked number. 
MR. SESSIONS: Okay, those are all the questions I 
have. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Johnson. 
MR. JOHNSON: Based on that, Judge, the State doesn't 
havp ari/thinq that wouJd be relevant- to ask the defendant. 
THE COURT: All right, you can be seated, Mr. Gallup. 
MR. SESSIONS: Your Honor, the defense has no other 
witnesses, and the defense would rest. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. JOHNSON: Judge, rhe State has no rebuttal. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. With that, ladies 
and gentlemen, the witnesses and the attorneys have finished 
tneir cases, and we are ready to --
MP. SESSIONS: xoui Honor, before we go any farther may 
I have a minute to talk with my client9 
THE COURT: Sure. 
































THE COURT: All right. 
MR. SESSIONS: -- that I need to 
THE COURT: All right. Okay, any 
MP. 
hear 




to him about. 
objection? 
needs something else to add, 
THE COURT: Okay. Come up -- bac 
you' 
BY 
re still under oath. 
MP. SESSIONS: Sorry 
little side tracked, 
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October of 2008, 
Utah County? 
pulled over 
y, so this testimony 
you m your car, 















Mr. Gallup. Of 
some questions. 
part of your 
So specifically 
on or about the 
by an officer? 
been brought out 
description, driving 
was in the vehicle 
questions at this 
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1 A. I do not know. 1 haven't --
2 Q. This is your car, right, that we're talking about on 
3 tljiat night? 
4 A. That's correct, the car is registered to me. 
5 Q. And you spoke to the officer about an hour after that 
6 incident, when he called you briefly, as you said, right? 
7 A. Correct. 
8 Q. At that point aidn't it seem important to talk to the 
9 officer a little more about the incident and figure out what he 
10 was talking about? 
11 A. I was --
12 Q. T h a t ' s a v vyes" o r "no" q u e s t i o n . 
13 A. At t h a t t i m e , no . 
14 Q. Didn't seem important to ask the officer more about 
15 what he was calling you about9 
16 A. At that time, no, I did not know why he was calling 
17 me. 
18 Q. Okay. Did you ask tne officer, "Hey, why are you 
1 9 call m g me ?" 
20 A. I did not, and he djd not relate that to me. 
21 0- Okay, did he -- why didn't you respond to him when he 
22 saiu, "Th±b is Tiunpei Cldiiton. I've: been on the freeway. I 
23 want to talk to vou about some events that happened tonight"? 
24 A. I bel — 
2 5 Q. Why did you hanq up on him? 
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1 A. I was under the impression he was calling on another 
2 matter, 
3 Q. Okay, bo did
 you then follow up with him about that 
A mettle L and ctsf moi<- qupstiors, or did you just hang up on him? 
5 A. It was my und^r -- my impression that he --
6 Q. Now — 
7 A. was investlqating another matter. 
8 Q. -- did you -- okay, so did you ask him about that 
9 matter, or did you just hang up on him? 
10 A. I hung up on Officer Clanton at that point. 
11 MP. JOHNSON: That's d]1 I have. Thank you. 
12 THE COURT: Anything else? 
13 MR. SESSIONS: Nothing else, your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: All ngnt, please be seated. 
15 MR. SESSIONS: I'll make my second attempt at resting. 
16 Now the defense rests. 
17 THE COURT: All right, 
18 MR. JOHNSON- The State still has no rebuttal. 
19 ThE COURT: All right. Okay, with that I think we are 
20 reaay to give trie iuiy the instructions as to the law; and then 
21 following that the attorneys will make their closing arguments 
22 I no you. So we nave copies of the instructions so that you can 
23 follow along. 
2A I will do my best to read them verbatim. Some days it 




and restart, you'll know that's why. Again, these are yours to 
keep. You can mark them as we go along. You can make notes. 
You can mark them in any way that you want, okay? I'll start 
with some water, ex;use me. 
(Court reads the jury instructions. Please refer to 
the case file for these.) 
THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Johnson, the State goes first. 
MR. JOHNSON: Thank you, Judge. Ladies and gentlemen, 
I have the opportunity to talk to you first and last. In 
between, Mr. Sessions gets to talk to you about his view of 
the evidence. I know we just read through these. I just 
want to focus on just a couple. 
If you'll turn with me to instruction Nos. 7 and 8. 
These are the elements instruction that kind of -- it's the 
step through -- step-by-step on which element. As we talked 
about before, Mr. Sessions, I think we're basically conceding 
that Nos. 2 through 6, on the failure to respond and on the 
next page, Nos. 2 through 5 are essentially not in dispute. 
It's just going to No. 1, was the driver Jeffery Gallup. 
I think on the others is clear, from Trooper Clanton's 
testimony, that he activated his emergency lights, he pulled 
the vehicle over, he saw the vehicle take off. So that's not 
m dispute, nor is the fact that he was going at least 88 miles 
an hour, and then up to 96, clearly in violation of the law and 
speeding. 
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1 As we' /e discussed, identity is the crucial issue. 
2 What evidence have you heard today about that? You have 
3 Trooper Clanton, who within 20 pounds was able to guess the 
4 derendant's weight, was able to ascertain the male Caucasian 
b with brown hair, pulled up a photo from his DMV license, was 
6 able to see that it was consistent, but he didn't stop there. 
7 He continued to investigate, continued to narrow it down. 
8 rou hecir i Mi . Mds?ionb say, you know, "How many people 
9 fit that profile?" That's why we have our officers do this 
10 kind of investigation. Thankfully he did; he was able to track 
11 down the defendant's phone number. You heard the conversation 
12 that they had. 
13 That it didn't go veiy far; but Trooper Clanton was 
14 doing everything he could in his power to investigate this 
15 crime, to make sure that the defendant was the one. If there 
16 was some sort of explanation he could offer Trooper Clanton to 
17 get him away from realizing he was the real driver, that was 
18 the opportunity to tell Trooper Clanton, and he didn't. 
19 I thmK that when you look at the totality of the 
20 circumstances, you will see that the defendant owned the car. 
21 He looked like the driver, was consistent with the picture of 
2/ ihe diiver; and wnen n^ nan an opportunity witmn that within 
23 an hour of this incident, he failed to take that opportunity 
24 to talk to the officer about the incident, to explain it away 
!5 somehow. 
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1 As a result, I think beyond a reasonable doubt you 
2 have seen that the defendant was the driver, and that Trooper 
3 Clanton's testimony pins him as the driver on the night of 
4 October 22r ', and I say you find him guilty. 
5 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Sessions, would you like to 
6 take the body mic from --
7 MR. SESSIONS: Sure. 
8 THE COURT: Then you'll be able to wander as you — 
9 MR. SESSIONS: I don't wander much, but I'll take it. 
10 THE COURT: We'll get the best sound if you'll just put 
11 it right up on your tie, Mr. Sessions. Just right up there at 
12 the top. Yep, that's good. 
13 MR. SESSIONS: How's that? 
14 THE COURT: Perfect. 
lb MR. SESSIONS: I want to start where Mr. Johnson ended. 
16 That was his opportunity to tell the trooper what happened. No, 
17 it wasn't his opportunity to tell the trooper what happened. 
18 His opportunity to tell what happened was today. He had a 
19 right to remain silent. He didn't have to testify. He could 
20 have said nothing, and the State had the burden of proof on all 
21 of the elements. 
22 I Judge Laycock has gone through over and over and over, 
23 partly at my insistance, at the reasonable doubt, because I 
24 think it's really important that the jury knows that this is 
25 an important case wh^re civil liberties are at stake; and the 
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Court and the statutes and the Constitution require that the 
evidence be presented beyond a reasonable doubt. 
There's been some talk in some of the jury instructions 
about the civil standard preponderance of the evidence, and a 
preponderance of the evidence is you take the evidence that's 
submitted and you compare it. If you get to the point where 
it's 51/49, you just get a little bit over the top, that's 
enough evidence in a civil case. 
So if we were m a civil case and we were fighting 
over even millions of dollars, all that the prevailing party 
would have to show is a little bit more, a little more likely 
than not in a preponderance; but that's not what we're here 
for, because this is a criminal case. 
We're not even here on a like a depravation of 
parental rights case, which would be clear and convincing 
evidence —I'm going to have to move — and on a clear and 
convincing evidence standard you have to be clearly convinced. 
What we're here for is beyond a reasonable doubt. So 
certainly the State has brought some evidence. They brought 
the evidence that my client's vehicle was found in Utah County 
being operated by somebody with brown hair, approximately 190 
pounds, and white. Well, if that's the best description we 
have, there's a lot of people in this courtroom who wouldn't be 
safe. I'm the only one with black hair who's a white male who 
wouldn't fit that description, 
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•1 The evidence simply isn't sufficient for a verdict of 
2 guilty in this case, because the trooper didn't have enough 
3 evidence. There's some evidence, maybe even a preponderance 
4 of evidence, maybe even some of you would be clearly convinced 
5 of evidence, but they're certainly not beyond a reasonable 
6 doubt. 
7 We all had the opportunity to watch the video. You 
8 watch the video, and you see the -- or you hear the trooper 
9 testify. He gets-out of his car, he's walking up, he's just 
10 about to turn on his flashlight, but before he turns on the 
11 flashlight to look through the dark window, the car zips off. 
12 If you watch the video again, if you decide to, it happens like 
13 that. You don't know it's going to happen, and then he's gone. 
14 The trooper even testified it took him a. second to 
15 kind of get things figured out. uOh, that guy just left. I've 
16 got to catch him." He hops in his car, and then we watch the 
17 chase. As to the elements of the crime, there's no question 
18 that this was an evading; there's no question it took place 
19 in Utah County; there's no question it took place on the date 
20 certain; and there's no question as to speeding, as well. The 
21 real question is whether or not there's enough evidence that my 
22 client was the one who was driving. 
23 You've heard the testimony from my client about the 
24 windows being tinted really dark in the back. You saw how far 
25 the officer got up there. He couldn't see in from where he was 
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1 before this vehicle leaves, and then it's dark. You, as jurors 
2 — that's why we have jurors. We have eight people who get to 
3 come and listen to the evidence — you know how difficult it is 
4 at night to see and to identify and then to remember. 
5 The officer testified that this was a dark blue BMW. 
6 Well, it was a grey BMW. So the officer wants to believe that 
7 this is the person who was the one, and that you should convict 
8 him/ but also in fairness to the defendant — think about this 
9 a little bit, too. 
10 This took place in October. There was a phone call 
11 to him, and it was an officer who said, >VI want to talk to you 
12 about some issues," and my client hung up on the phone, didn't 
13 want to talk to him. The officer said, vvWell, people don't 
14 have to talk to me. If they don't want to talk to me, they 
15 don't have to talk to me." There was other matters pending. 
16 He just hung up, didn't want to talk to him. 
17 Well, that goes on, and then November happens, and 
18 December, January, February, March. Five months later it's 
19 bugging the officer. He's got some questions and some concerns 
20 and he doesn't know — he's like this just is really bugging 
21 me. So he didn't testify there was any new evidence. He just 
22 testified, "I went ahead and filed the case." 
23 Took a while for my client then to hear about the 
24 case. My client hears about the case, and they want to know 
25 what happened way back then. All he knows is, as he testified, 
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1 he testified to that he wasn't in Utah County that night. He 
2 didn't drive the vehicle, and he wasn't evading. Now, beyond 
3 that he has no burden to prove anything else. He is, as the 
-4 Court has instructed you, and as you all agreed, that he come 
5 in here presumed innocent, and until the State proves each and 
6 every element beyond a reasonable doubt, then he is to be found 
7 not guilty. Each and every one of you has to be convinced. It 
8 has to be a unanimous verdict, as the Judge said. 
9 So let me go back and look at this a little bit. So 
10 I'm going to ask you each individually to when you go back to 
11 the jury room, spend some time. Think about what you heard. 
12 Think about the evidence that came into this Court, and make a 
13 decision that you can feel comfortable with. 
14 I would like to call it the — because the beyond the 
15 reasonable doubt, it's such a tough one to get a hold of, and 
16 you have to follow what the Judge's instruction is, because 
17 that's what beyond a reasonable doubt is; but a good way I 
18 found for people to think of that is, "Can I sleep on it well?" 
19 If I do my verdict, and I go home tonight and I sleep, 
2 0 will I wake up in the morning and say, vvYeah, I did the right 
21 thing." I either find him guilty and I have no questions about 
22 it, and he should have been found guilty, or I found him not 
23 guilty, and that's the right decision. All we ask is that you 
24 make the right decision. Thank you for listening today, and 
2 5 we'll await vour verdict. 
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1 MR. JOHNSON: Now is my final chance to address you. 
2 When we talk about reasonable doubt, as has been mentioned to 
3 you ad nausedm, what as reasonable here^ Is it reasonable that 
4 someone stole his vehicle and was driving it that night? Well, 
5 you heard Trooper Clanton testify, without any objection to 
6 that, his research indicted it was the defendant's car and had 
7 never been reported stoJen. 
8 Maybe someone borrowed his car and took it. Well, 
9 when we asked him on the stand, what did he say? He says, "I 
3 0 don't know." Somehow he doesn't remember back then because it 
11 was too far, too long ago, but he's sure wasn't in Jtah County. 
12 He's sure he wasn't driving the car that night. So which is 
13 it? You can't talk out of both sides of your mouth. 
14 Looking at Instruction No. 12, when you talk about 
15 judging the witnesses for what* they are. Yes, coming into 
16 this courtroom at the beginning of today he was innocent until 
17 proven guilty; but Wxth the evidence you heard from Trooper 
18 Clanton, and when you saw the defendant take the stand m his 
19 own behalf, and you observed his demeanor throughout this 
20 trial, you are the judges. His appearance on the witness 
21 stand, looking at the reasonableness of his statement, their 
22 apparent frankness and candoi, or want of it. 
23 You saw the testimony. You saw the interruptions. 
24 What is reasonable here9 Wnat is reasonable here? Is it 
25 reasonable, when you look at this as a piece of a puzzle, 
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1 that the defendant's car is stopped, an individual matching 
2 the defendant's car is behind the wheel, the sole occupant, and 
3 that Officer — Trooper Clanton calls the defendant. There's 
4 no doubt who's the defendant. At that point, to get a call 
5 from an officer, what is reasonable? 
6 J You heard hum say, "Well, 1 thought he was calling 
7 about something else." Did you then ask him, ''Well, what are 
8 you calling about? Let's talk some more about this. Can we 
9 clear this up?" I was never -- I was not out there. I don't 
10 know what you're talking about. I haven't met you before. 
11 None of those things happened. 
12 What happened was he hung up the phone. Is that 
13 reasonable to believe that he was ]ust confused. That he was 
14 just exercising his right to remain silent. Is that what he 
15 said to you today? Did he say, "I decided to exercise my right 
16 to remain silent/ and I hung up." That's not what he said. 
17 MR. SESSIONS: Your Honor, I ™ the defendant's net 
18 required to say that; and I think making comments upon his 
19 exercising of that right in closing is inappropriate. So I 
20 would object. 
21 THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection, although I 
22 thuiK enougn's oeen saia. 
2 3 MR. JOHNSON: Okay. Hanging up that phone, ladies and 
2 4 gentlemen, showed his consciousness of guilt. On October 22nd 
2 5 of 2008 he got away from Trooper Clanton. Do not let him get 
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1 away again. Thank you. 
2 THE COUPT Okay, we need to have Jenny sworn in. 
3 COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that you will keep 
4 this jury together in some quiet and convenient place until 
5 they agree upon a verdict, or have been discharged by the 
6 Court. That you will not suffer any communication to be made 
7 to tnem, or make any yourself, except to ask them if they have 
8 agreed upon a verdict. That you will not, before the verdict 
9 is rendered, communicate to any person the state of their 
10 deliberation or the verdict agreed upon, and that you will 
11 return them into the Court when they have agreed, or when so 
12 ordered by the Court, so help you God? 
13 COUPT BAILIFF: *es. 
14 THE COURT: Counsel, I need to ask you about two things 
15 that I may need to tell the jury before we go in. 
16 (Discussion at the bench off the record) 
17 THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, there are two things 
18 that we need to let you know. Exhibit 1 is the actual DVD. It 
19 is apparently not possible to cut you just the version of what 
20 wa^ played in Court. There are other things on that DVD that 
21 are not relevant, and that ycu don't need to see. 
22 So if you want to watcn tne DVD, Jenny will play it 
23 for you. She knows where to stop it. She knows where to end 
24 it, so that it's just what you saw m Court; but we can't hand 
25 it to you and let you watch the whole thing, because it has 
